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Abstract—In this work, we investigate how the governance
features of a managed currency (e.g., a fiat currency) can be
built into a cryptocurrency in order to leverage potential benefits
found in the use of blockchain technology and smart contracts.
The resulting managed cryptocurrency can increase transparency
and integrity, while potentially enabling the emergence of novel
monetary instruments. It has similarities to cash in that it
enables the general public to immediately transfer funds to a
recipient without intermediary systems being involved. However,
our system is account-based, unlike circulating bank notes that
are self-contained. Our design would allow one to satisfy know
your customer laws and be subject to law enforcement actions
following legal due process (e.g., account freezing and fund
seizure), while mitigating counterparty risk with checks and
balances. Funds can thus be transferred only between approved
and authenticated users. Our system has on-chain governance
capabilities using smart contracts deployed on a dedicated,
permissioned blockchain that has different sets of control mech-
anisms for who can read data, write data, and publish blocks.
To enable the governance features, only authorized identity
proofed entities can submit transactions. To enable privacy, only
the block publishers can read the blockchain; the publishers
maintain dedicated nodes that provide access controlled partial
visibility of the blockchain data. Being permissioned, we can
use a simple consensus protocol with no transaction fees. A
separate security layer prevents denial of service and a balance
of power mechanism prevents any small group of entities from
having undue control. While permissioned, we ensure that no one
entity controls the blockchain data or block publishing capability
through a voting system with publicly visible election outcomes.
Index Terms—Blockchain, Cryptocurrency, Digital Cash, Fiat
Currency, Smart Contract
I. INTRODUCTION
Bitcoin is a protocol for a permissionless distributed ledger
that was designed to provide non-reversible transactions with
direct account-to-account fund transfers where no third party
needs to be trusted [1]. It leveraged blockchain technology
to enable a form of non-sovereign digital currency that was
previously not possible. It and subsequent cryptocurrencies
introduced smart contracts and new kinds of decentralized
governance models that have significant organizational and
political implications (e.g., having no relationship with any
government). With respect to these systems, [2] points out
that cryptocurrencies can enable users to remain anonymous,
can have permissionless access, and thus usually do not sup-
port know your customer (KYC) and anti-money laundering
(AML) laws at the protocol level by design. In this work, we
investigate how to leverage some of the novel benefits provided
by blockchain technology and smart contracts to enable a new
form of managed cryptocurrency that has built-in support for
KYC and AML laws with system governance mechanisms
along with a balance of power structure. Note that we are not
suggesting that such a cryptocurrency should necessarily be
issued, as that decision involves policy and economic factors
outside of the scope of this work. Instead, we are proposing
a technical architecture that could lead towards the technical
ability to do so.
We investigate how the governance features of a managed
currency (e.g., a fiat currency) can be built into a cryptocur-
rency in order to leverage potential benefits found in the use
of blockchain technology and smart contracts. It is designed to
be compatible with and augment a partner managed currency,
the users being able to freely exchange one for the other. The
resulting managed cryptocurrency can increase transparency
and integrity, while potentially enabling the emergence of
novel monetary instruments. It has similarities to cash in that
it enables the general public to immediately transfer funds to
a recipient without intermediary systems being involved and
the associated counterparty risks (a single transaction to the
system transfers funds). This is accomplished through a dis-
tributed multi-party managed cryptocurrency system providing
guarantees similar to Bitcoin style cryptocurrencies. However
unlike circulating bank notes, our system is account-based and
all recipients are identity proofed and authorized. Our design
thus supports the satisfaction of KYC and AML laws at the
protocol level. Entities distinct from the platform and currency
managers can register as identity providers, ensuring fund
transfers only to identity proofed and authenticated recipients
while maintaining openness to the private sector and com-
petition. Accounts would also be subject to law enforcement
actions following legal due process to include the freezing of
accounts and fund seizure.
Our system has on-chain governance capabilities us-
ing smart contracts deployed on a dedicated, permissioned
blockchain that has different sets of control mechanisms for
who can read data, write data, and publish blocks. To enable
the cryptocurrency to have built-in governance roles along with
KYC/AML checks, only authorized identity proofed entities
can submit transactions. To support user privacy features, only
the miners (referred to henceforth as validators) can read
the blockchain. Validators then maintain dedicated nodes that
provide access controlled partial visibility of blockchain data
to users (e.g., their account balance, transaction history, and
system management transactions). Being permissioned, we can
use a lightweight consensus protocol. The protocol could be
as simple as the dirty round robin used in Multichain [3]. The
use of a security layer that prevents denial of service attacks
(which works since all accounts must be pre-authorized and
can easily be filtered) can enable a no transaction fee system
where the validators are paid by the currency issuer to maintain
the currency. Lastly, the architecture contains a balance of
power mechanism to prevent any small group of entities from
having undue control over the blockchain data or publication
of new blocks. While it is a permissioned system, there is not
a single entity that decides which accounts can publish blocks.
Instead, the existing group of validators vote to determine
changes to validator eligibility, with the outcomes being made
publicly visible. No one entity controls the blockchain data or
block publishing capability.
We implemented our architecture using smart contracts
written with the Solidity programming language and made
the code open source under a public domain license. It has
functions for fund tracking, fiat-to-cryptocurrency fund conver-
sion, transaction logging, account creation, voting scenarios,
a bootstrapping mode, role assignment, and the ability of
accounts to take special actions given their roles (e.g., law
enforcement account freezing and central bank fund creation).
A set of initial parameters are used to bootstrap the initial
governance options but afterwards a voting system is used for
multiple accounts with various roles to collectively manage
different aspects of the cryptocurrency.
Research economists seem divided about the effectiveness
of central bank issued cryptocurrencies. Some, like in [4],
point out the potential economic viability of such assets.
Others are more critical: [2] for instance states that there is
a ‘non-case’ for a central bank cryptocurrency; their rationale
for this was based on perceived immutable features of cryp-
tocurrencies that would make them useless as alternatives to
digital currency. In this work, we want to show that these fea-
tures, considered immutable, can be altered through changing
technical fundamentals about how a cryptocurrency blockchain
works; this could enable sovereign cryptocurrencies with fiat
currency style governance. Non-sovereign cryptocurrencies
started the discussion on how to use blockchain to make
the global financial system more stable and distributed; we
hope that our work on sovereign cryptocurrencies will further
facilitate that discussion.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II discusses the foundational technology that underlies the
design of our cryptocurrency platform. Section III presents
our cryptocurrency architecture while section IV explains the
account roles within that architecture. Section V discusses how
to instantiate our cryptocurrency to integrate it with a fiat cur-
rency. Section VI analyzes the security model of our approach
and Section VII discusses our implementation. Section VIII
summarizes related efforts and section IX concludes.
II. FOUNDATIONAL TECHNOLOGY
Our managed cryptocurrency leverages existing approaches
and borrows concepts from other technologies. This includes
the cryptocurrency role system, on-chain governance of valida-
tor nodes, on-chain voting, and the decoupling of the validation
and execution of transactions.
Our managed currency relies upon each cryptocurrency
account being assigned a set of roles; these roles enable
the management and use of the currency. Assigning roles to
cryptocurrency accounts was initially introduced in [5].
On-chain governance is used to manage the set of validators
through the assignment of ‘validator’ roles to accounts, those
allowed to participate in a consensus algorithm to publish
blocks. This concept of on-chain validator governance can
be found in the Proof of Authority (PoA) consensus model.
Here, block creation is distributed among different allowed
nodes over time while offering Byzantine fault tolerance. PoA
with smart contract based validator governance is implemented
in the Ethereum client Parity (through the Aura consensus
algorithm [6]) and by POA Network [7]. Another example of
a PoA implementation can be found in the Microsoft Azure
Blockchain system [8].
To manage the set of validators as well as other system
functions, our managed cryptocurrency smart contracts must
implement voting mechanisms which add or remove roles,
as well as to approve or disapprove system security actions
such as fund transfer reversals. Various standards and projects
provide blockchain technology for decentralized voting [9];
the Ethereum standard EIP-1202 [10] offers for example an
interface for implementing voting within smart contracts. As
another example, the open-source project Aragon [11], built
on Ethereum, allows token holders to cast a vote on protocol
upgrades by signing a specific transaction. The Delegated
Proof of Stake (DPoS) consensus algorithm, used for instance
in BitShares [12], is another illustration of an on-chain voting
structure. In BitShares, users vote by staking tokens into an-
other account (called ’delegate’); the delegate account is then
allowed to execute certain actions on behalf of its stakeholders
(such as producing blocks and voting on protocol upgrades).
Lastly, our cryptocurrency introduces the concept of a
’Security Gateway’. A list of gateways linked to their as-
sociated validators, maintained at the smart contract level,
are charged with pre-processing incoming transactions. This
decouples the execution and validation of transactions. The
Hyperledger Fabric, a permissioned blockchain, also has a
similar decoupling [13]. Note that any mention of commercial
products in this paper is for information only; it does not imply
recommendation or endorsement.
III. CRYPTOCURRENCY ARCHITECTURE
A cryptocurrency platform providing the benefits described
in Section I and leveraging technology from Section II can
be built using the following architecture. Figure 1 shows the
overall architecture from the perspective of a single validator.
Fig. 1. Interactions of an Individual Validator
A. Platform Architecture
The architecture requires a permissioned smart contract
cryptocurrency platform, such as PoA-based Ethereum. It
should be configured to not charge transaction fees or gas
for sending transactions to the smart contracts. The native
cryptocurrency mechanisms of the platform will not be used
and instead the cryptocurrency will be stored within the smart
contracts (similar to token based ERC-20 [14] compliant smart
contract currencies but running on a dedicated platform).
Without gas and transaction fees, validators will be rewarded
either off-chain or will participate through being inherently
motivated to support the cryptocurrency. This is tractable
because our use of a lightweight consensus model makes the
execution of a validator node less expensive (it is done this way
currently by other permissioned blockchain platforms such as
Hyperledger Fabric).
The set of smart contracts will be fixed to a small set used to
maintain the cryptocurrency. Being a permissioned system, the
block publishing software must determine which validators are
allowed to participate in the publication of new blocks. This
set of permitted validators is managed at the smart contract
layer and can be retrieved from the blockchain. In this way
our architecture marries what are usually isolated governance
layers, the protocol layer which manages the validator node
permissions and the smart contract layer which executes code
on behalf of system users.
B. Security Gateway
Also managed at the smart contract layer is the list of
gateways that each validator maintains to accept proposed
transactions from the users of the system. These security
gateways pre-process incoming transactions to ascertain their
validity. Transactions must be properly formatted and are only
accepted from accounts that have roles. Security gateways
also keep track of the rate of transactions issued by each
account. Accounts with an unusually high rate can be throttled
as a form of denial of service protection and to prevent any
particular account from taking too large a percentage of system
resources. It is possible to white list accounts that have a valid
reason to issue a high throughput of transactions.
C. Visibility Gateway
A final platform level resource managed and made visible
at the smart contract layer is the set of visibility gateways.
Each validator independently maintains a set of such gateways
to provide controlled blockchain read access for the account
holders. The read access capabilities will be encoded as smart
contract view functions (a view function is one that provides
read only access and is highly efficient as it is executed locally
and not propagated among validators nor included within a
block like a normal transaction). However, unlike with typical
view function responses, for security reasons (discussed in
section VI) the responses will be signed by the associated
validator account. The full blockchain is kept private by the
validators and user read access is only available through the
visibility gateways.
D. Smart Contracts
The smart contract layer, besides managing the authorized
platform level resources listed previously, implements the
managed cryptocurrency. The smart contracts maintain the
list of authorized accounts, the roles granted to each account
with associated features, and the balance in each account.
We use the account/balance model as opposed to the unspent
transaction output (UTXO) model (e.g., in Bitcoin) to avoid
the unnecessary complexity (found in [5]) of having to label
each unspent transaction with roles. The roles define a set
of permissions that enable certain accounts to manage the
cryptocurrency and are discussed in the following section.
E. Digital Wallets
Identity proofing results in the participants’ identifiers being
added to a global on-chain registry controlled by the account
providers. As described in [15], the identifiers can be held
in custodial, semi-custodial, or non-custodial digital wallets
that can be integrated into existing applications, browsers, and
operating systems.
IV. MANAGED CRYPTOCURRENCY ROLES
The management features and integration with an associated
fiat currency are enabled through accounts with various roles.
This account and role capability is instantiated on top of the
previously described platform and implemented within the
fixed set of smart contracts. Section V will describe how these
roles can be used in real world systems.
A. Platform Managers
An account with the platform manager role sets the policy
for the cryptocurrency system and creates accounts and assigns
them non-user roles. Policy can be set to be permanent,
temporary, or have a timed expiration. Permanent policies
cannot be changed once set (assuming the integrity of the
blockchain itself is not compromised). They may be used to
instantiate a particular architecture that the cryptocurrency will
adopt. Alternately, they may be used to provide confidence to
the user base that certain features or settings are guaranteed
even though the cryptocurrency is managed by a set of
privileged entities. Temporary policies can be changed at any
time by a currency manager. Timed expiration policies are
considered permanent until a published time at which they
become temporary. The system may be set up with only one
platform manager, a group of accounts that must vote to
make changes, or a hierarchical system where higher priority
managers can override policies from lower level managers (as
in [5]). This latter design can be used as a security feature in
case a currency manager account was compromised; higher
priority accounts whose keys are stored in physical vaults
could be used to override the compromised account and restore
the system.
The policies available to be set can include en-
abling/disabling features within other roles, setting blockchain
parameters such as the size and frequency of blocks, adjusting
any fees charged (if any), and setting parameters on how voting
will be performed (since the system requires groups to vote
to perform certain actions).
During the bootstrapping phase for the cryptocurrency,
within some fixed number of blocks, the platform manager
defines the initial set of validators. Once the bootstrapping
phase is over, the accounts with the platform manager role may
not modify the validator roles (thus limiting their authority and
creating a balance of power).
B. Account Providers
An account with an account provider role has been autho-
rized by the platform manager(s) to manage user accounts.
They identity proof users off-chain, receive a list of the
users not yet authorized accounts, and add the user role to
those accounts to authorize them. It is important that the
users demonstrate ownership of each provided account through
proving possession of the associated private key. Each account
provider then keeps an internal record of which users are
associated with which accounts; this record is not published
or shared. This allows KYC and AML laws to be supported at
the account provider level (rather than at the entire platform
level), which may enhance security and user privacy.
C. System Security
An account with the system security role has the ability
to control other accounts for system security purposes. Such
accounts can freeze and unfreeze other accounts. They can
also move funds between accounts to confiscate funds or
reverse transactions. In the latter case we note that the relevant
accounts simply need to be debited and credited funds due
to our system being account-based (as opposed to following
Bitcoin’s UTXO model). We also note that since all accounts
are identity proofed, system security actions can take place
off-chain using existing legal frameworks.
To limit unauthorized actions, policy can be set by the
platform manager requiring an on-chain voting mechanism for
certain system security transactions. In addition, the platform
manager(s) can limit or disable any of the powers of the system
security role through policy settings.
D. Users
An account with the user role is one that can be used to
receive, store, and send value in the form of tokens maintained
by the smart contracts. A single user may have multiple
accounts and may use multiple account providers to do so
(note that every account must be identity proofed by an
account provider).
Each account is labelled within the smart contract with its
associated public key. A user maintains use of an account
through possession of the associated private key (possibly
stored on a hardware token for greater security). If a user loses
a private key or suspects that their private key has been stolen,
they need a way to retake possession of the account. This is
accomplished by swapping out the account’s original public
key with a new one within the smart contract. When creating
their account, users can choose what method they prefer to
enable this action; there are at least three options. They can
trust their account provider to do this for them and simply re-
identity proof to their account provider. They could authorize
a set of other accounts to validate the public key swap (using
accounts they own or accounts of trusted individuals). Or they
could require the involvement of system security along with
their account provider, necessitating re-identity proofing with
both entities.
E. Currency Managers
An account with the currency manager role has the ability
to control the money supply through direct actions or ongoing
policy. This includes fund creation, deletion, and the provision
of interest. The currency manager accounts vote to set mon-
etary policy or initiate an action (for example the creation of
funds to be lent to other entities).
F. Validators
An account with the validator role is an account that rep-
resents an authorized block publisher. Validator accounts vote
to add/remove the validator role to/from other accounts. Other
than block publishing, the validators manage their respective
security and visibility gateways. On their visibility gateways,
they make visible all cryptocurrency management transactions
to provide full transparency to all users.
Each validator account posts on the smart contract the
Internet Protocol (IP) addresses of their security and visibility
gateways. The visibility gateways then make the security
and visibility gateway addresses visible to all users and the
validation server addresses visible to other accounts with the
validator role. This latter publication facilitates the peer-to-
peer permissioned networking between validators used for
transaction propagation and block publication.
Each validator account publishes on the blockchain a pub-
licly visible special public key associated with the signed
responses from its visibility gateways. This key is different
from the public key for the validator account itself. It also
publicly publishes contact information (e.g., an email address)
for reporting any problems. This is essential for security
reasons discussed in Section VI.
V. INTEGRATION WITH FIAT CURRENCIES
The architecture presented in sections III and IV is designed
to be integrated with a fiat currency and traditional bank
deposits. A government administration could instantiate the
cryptocurrency and act as the platform manager. The directors
of the government’s independent central bank could act as the
currency managers. The government law enforcement agencies
could act in the system security role. This creates a balance
of power where no one organization ‘controls’ the blockchain.
To further promote this, government entities separate from the
administration can act as the validators (e.g., a set of states).
The national standards body can define the specification for the
supporting cryptocurrency software and independent laborato-
ries can test compliance of that software. Note that multiple
developers should be used, especially for the validator soft-
ware, for security purposes and the code should be developed
open source and made available publicly. This way a single
developer cannot maliciously or unintentionally violate the
specification and enable non-protocol compliant blocks to be
published and accepted.
Financial institutions (e.g., commercial banks, cryptocur-
rency exchanges, and other fintech companies) could be made
account providers, among other entities, since they already
must identity proof their customers. They would keep their
mapping of identity proofed users to account numbers private
and only reveal select information to fulfill a court order
(thus supporting KYC and AML laws while still maintaining
user privacy). They can modify their banking software to
simultaneously show users their bank deposit balances and
cryptocurrency balances (since they established each user’s
accounts). The financial institution itself would not have
access to the user’s cryptocurrency balance and transactions
but their banking application, on behalf of the user, could
retrieve this information from the visibility gateways. These
applications could then enable the conversion of bank deposits
to cryptocurrency and vice versa (also often referred as on-
ramp/off-ramp). The application could send cryptocurrency
to the financial institution and have the institution deposit
traditional money into the user’s bank accounts (and vice
versa). The application could also transfer funds between the
user’s different cryptocurrency accounts using a bank owned
account as an intermediary to hide any linkage between the
user’s accounts from appearing on the blockchain. Note that
the financial institution obtains cryptocurrency through its
existing fiat accounts with the central bank: the institution
sends the central bank fiat currency and the central bank sends
it cryptocurrency. If users are allowed to interact directly with
the central bank, users can perform this operation themselves.
The central bank, as the currency manager, unifies the fiat
and cryptocurrency by enabling the exchange between both.
The cryptocurrency could be maintained as a separate line
item on the central bank balance sheet. The central bank can
create and destroy both currencies and thus can implement a
cryptocurrency monetary policy in a similar fashion as when
managing solely its fiat currency. Note that offering two forms
of currency, with different characteristics and risk profiles, can
have significant economic implications that are out of scope
for this paper.
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section we analyze the security and functionality pro-
vided by our architecture using the three traditional computer
security pillars of confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
A. Confidentiality
Our architecture provides accounts/transactions that are
pseudonymous for the validators and confidential to the rest
of the users. We note that there is a possibility of user
confidentiality being lifted when necessary to support KYC
and AML laws (e.g., through a court order for validators
to reveal transactions and the respective account providers
to divulge account ownership). Users choose which account
provider they trust to know which accounts they own. The
account provider keeps this private unless required to reveal
it. Furthermore, the account provider can distribute user funds
between the user’s accounts such that there is no linkage on
the blockchain between the multiple accounts from the same
user.
The transactions on the blockchain are kept private and only
shared within the set of validators. The visibility gateways
only reveal blockchain transactions to the parties involved in
those transactions. A downside of this is that it would appear
then that accounts with the platform manager, system security,
and currency manager roles can issue transactions without
oversight. However, the validators are independent entities that
make these transactions publicly visible through their visibility
gateways. This offers transparency for all management trans-
actions but confidentiality for user fund transfers.
The IP addresses of the validating servers are stored on the
blockchain but the visibility gateways make this information
visible only to the validator accounts. Thus, the validation
servers themselves are kept confidential. If this information
was leaked, a single transaction could be used to update a
revealed server to a new IP address (to discourage denial of
service (DoS) attacks). The security gateways and visibility
gateways’ addresses are made public. The visibility gateways
operate independently with only a copy of the blockchain and
thus can be replicated at scale to counter possible DoS attacks.
Likewise, a validator may have multiple security gateways to
provide load balancing and DoS protection.
B. Integrity
The use of a group of independent validators ensures the
integrity of the newly published blocks. No validator will
accept a block from another validator that does not follow
the established protocol. Each block and the transactions
therein must be of the proper form and have the necessary
digital signatures. As is the norm with blockchains, each block
contains a hash of the previous block to enable detection of
any changes with previously published blocks. However unlike
public blockchain systems, the users themselves cannot verify
the retained integrity of the blockchain and so another mech-
anism must exist to hold individual validators accountable.
For this, user software will query multiple visibility gate-
ways when retrieving user blockchain data. Any discrepancy
between the visibility gateways owned by different validators
reveals a problem with one of the validators. An exception
is for very recent transactions that have not yet been posted
by all validators and thus there should thus be an agreed-
upon time delay before taking any action. In the case of a
discrepancy, an event transaction is triggered and sent to all
validators to describe the discrepancy. As long as at least one
validator is honest, the discrepancy will be published. Note
that this is considered a ‘management’ type transaction and
thus is made publicly visible to all users. Note that since the
visibility gateways sign their responses, the user can prove
that multiple visibility gateways provided different answers.
As long as a majority of the validators remain honest, the
honest ones can vote out any validators that provide incorrect
results.
If a set of the validators decide to overtly violate the
cryptocurrency protocol (e.g., to change a permanent policy
or take control away from the platform or currency man-
agers), this will fork the blockchain as happens with other
cryptocurrency systems. The non-violating validators would
inform participating parties using off-chain methods and, like
other cryptocurrency forks, the resolution would take place
off-chain. Given that the cryptocurrency will be tied to a
fiat currency, investigations and legal action may be taken
against the violating validators. Note that only if 100 percent
of the validators collude can they make changes without being
noticed. Also, note that our cryptocurrency leverages the fact
that it is a sovereign currency, existing within an off-chain
legal framework.
C. Availability
There are two types of availability that need to be con-
sidered: the availability of the cryptocurrency system as a
whole and the availability of a particular account to conduct
transactions.
The cryptocurrency platform itself has robust availability
because it is a distributed system with no central point of fail-
ure. Many of the validation servers may fail, even the majority
of them, and the system can still continue to function. Note
that individual validation servers can be run efficiently due
to the use of a lightweight consensus algorithm, permitted by
the permissioned blockchain configuration. Also, each security
and visibility gateway can be implemented as a cluster of
servers to reduce susceptibility to DoS attacks and individual
server failures.
Individual accounts are not dependent upon a particular
validator and user applications should issue transactions to
multiple systems simultaneously (this includes both write
transactions to the security gateways and read transactions
to the visibility gateways). Using multiple security gateways
ensures that no validator could decide to unilaterally block a
particular account (note that account ownership is pseudony-
mous to the validators making this less likely). Using multiple
visibility gateways, as discussed above, addresses integrity
concerns.
VII. IMPLEMENTATION
We implemented our managed cryptocurrency as smart
contracts using the Solidity programming language. It
is available as open source software on Github at
https://github.com/usnistgov/managed token under a public
domain license. In this proof-of-concept prototype, we imple-
mented the core functions of the managed cryptocurrency. This
includes fund tracking, fiat to cryptocurrency fund conversion,
transaction logging, account creation, voting scenarios, boot-
strapping mode, role assignment, and the ability of accounts
to take special actions given their roles (e.g., law enforcement
account freezing and central bank fund creation). Certain
aspects are simplified, such as monetary policy options, as our
goal was not to create a production system but to demonstrate
that this managed architecture approach is feasible. We tested
our code by deploying it to a local Ethereum test environment.
A couple of money creation schemes are provided in our
system as examples. Schemes are provided to vote and carry
out money creation in arbitrary accounts (following a top-
down approach) as well as in all user accounts in the form of
interests (following a bottom-up approach). Furthermore, these
schemes can be either push-based or pull-based. In the push-
based model, the money creation function creates funds in the
recipient(s) account without any action being required from the
recipient(s). In the pull-based model, the currency managers
set rules through a single transaction to give the right to the
recipient(s) to create their own funds according to this set of
rules. This can provide scalability gains as users do not have to
claim their allowance right away, and instead, may wait until
they need it without any risk of not receiving it. In the case of
periodic funds creation (e.g. interests, dividends), a user might
be able to skip claiming funds between period X and period
X + Y, and then, withdraw funds at period X + Y + 1 for all
of the periods between X and X + Y + 1 combined. Finally,
a set of view functions allows one to selectively control the
visibility of monetary creation and other on-chain fund data,
both at the user level and at the currency management level
(e.g., global supply indicators).
Note that our implementation did not cover the off-chain
aspects of our cryptocurrency architecture. In particular, we
did not build the security or visibility gateways (although we
did write the smart contract view functions to support the
latter). We also did not modify the Ethereum mining software
to only publish blocks in collaboration with the validators
specified by the smart contracts (but we did implement the
smart contract code to enable a set of validators to use the
on-chain data to manage themselves).
VIII. RELATED WORK
Most of the existing work related to managed cryptocurren-
cies consists in studies and pilots on blockchain-based central
bank digital currencies (CBDC), as well as research and
development of protocols for stablecoins, algorithmic currency
management, and privacy-preserving KYC/AML checks.
The literature distinguishes two main categories of CBDCs:
wholesale and retail. As explained by the Bank for Inter-
national Settlements (BIS) in their money taxonomy [16], a
wholesale CBDC is only available to financial institutions
and mainly intended for inter-bank transactions whereas a
retail CBDC is globally accessible and usable by the general
public. Our managed cryptocurrency architecture is geared
towards retail CBDCs, although it could also be launched as
a wholesale CBDC, at least initially.
We have developed our architecture to change how cryp-
tocurrencies usually work to enable support for retail CBDCs.
As stated earlier, this does not mean that we are necessarily
claiming that one should be created; we are simply providing
some of the technical capability to do so. That said, the subject
of state or central bank issued cryptocurrencies has been one
of considerable interest. A BIS poll in 2018 showed that
more than 70 percent of central banks worldwide were already
engaged in CBDC work [17]. Some central banks, such as the
central bank of Canada (project Jasper [18]), the Monetary
Authority of Singapore (project Ubin [19]), or the Bank
of Thailand [20] have focused their research on wholesale
CBDC. Also, the European Central Bank and the Bank of
Japan are conducting joint research on wholesale CBDCs with
Project Stella [21]. Others, such as the Ecuadorian Central
Bank (’Dinero Electronico’ [22]), the People’s Bank of China
[23], and the Government of Venezuela (Petro [24]) aim at
developing a CBDC for retail use. It should be noted, however,
that many central bank efforts do not use (nor plan to use in the
future) distributed ledger technologies (DLT); for example the
Sveriges Riksbank from Sweden [25] stated that they currently
deemed DLT too inefficient for use in a retail CBDC. An
example of a non-DLT retail electronic currency is the e-Peso
[26]. This is a pilot from the Central Bank of Uruguay that
was launched as complement to physical cash but relied on a
central registry for ownership recording.
Aside from efforts from governments and central banks,
several other blockchain-based research projects have entered
the field of managed cryptocurrencies. For example, RScoin
[27] provides a cryptocurrency framework using a UTXO
model where generation of the monetary supply is controlled
by a central authority and transaction processing is handled by
dedicated institutions, called ‘mintettes’; ultimately, the central
authority handles the creation and posting of new blocks. Our
system differs from this approach in that currency managers
do not influence the block creation process nor benefit from
special viewing rights over the content of the blockchain.
Another example of a managed cryptocurrency system can be
found in Fedcoin [28], which builds upon RScoin’s framework
by providing a Node.js implementation, KYC rules that enable
a central bank to blacklist users, and improved anonymity
features. However, unlike our proposal, it does not natively
offer the ability for accounts to be assigned roles; this leaves
the central bank as the sole entity involved in the identity
provider, management, and system security functions (e.g.,
identity-proofing new accounts, freezing unlawful users, and
coin production).
‘Decentralized Finance’ projects, many of which are cur-
rently built with smart contracts deployed on the public
Ethereum blockchain or as second layer solutions atop Bitcoin,
are also being developed for stablecoins and decentralized
currency management where money supply is governed algo-
rithmically (such as Dai [29]). In our system, unlike reserve-
backed stablecoins (such as Libra [30], USD Coin [31],
and J.P. Morgan Coin [32]) that are pegged one-to-one with
the asset(s) that they represent, there is a built-in currency
manager role that can develop monetary instruments and vote
for monetary policies to increase and decrease the currency
supply. Since it is programmable, novel, potentially more
flexible monetary instruments may be implemented.
From a security point of view, efforts are being made to offer
security standards, toolsets, and services for cryptocurrencies.
For example, EIP-1080 [33] is an Ethereum standard that
offers an interface geared towards charge back and theft
prevention/resolution for ERC-20 tokens [14]. Also, more
loosely related is that the Enterprise Ethereum Alliance (EEA)
Legal Industry Working Group [34] intends to standardize law-
compliant smart contract designs.
Our system provides user privacy through use of a permis-
sioned blockchain that supports roles with different responsi-
bilities and data visibility (e.g., block publishers cannot see ac-
count owners’ identities). However, cash transactions offer an
ideal for anonymity and attempts to achieve this ideal for elec-
tronic currencies have been the subject of much research. The
development of some privacy-preserving technologies, such as
zero-knowledge protocols, has assisted in this objective. For
example, Chaum introduced eCash [35] in 1983, one of the
first attempts at anonymizing electronic money transactions
via the use of blind signatures; Zcash [36] is an example
of cryptocurrency that relies on a type of zero-knowledge
proof called zk-SNARKs for keeping transactions private; and
ChainAnchor [37] offers a method based on the ‘Enhanced
Privacy ID’ zero-knowledge protocol for controlling access to
a permissioned blockchain while allowing users to transact
pseudonymously and maintain transaction unlinkability.
IX. CONCLUSION
Most cryptocurrencies and cryptocurrency research efforts
focus on providing cryptocurrencies with strong anonymity
and privacy guarantees in a robust distributed system that is
not owned or managed by any single entity or group. We do
not dispute the importance of such efforts and the emergence
of the associated new social constructs, but point out that
research in managed cryptocurrencies integrated with our
current institutions has been sorely lacking. This is unfortunate
as all people live under the laws of their respective countries
and it is thus important to research cryptocurrencies that can
explicitly support those laws.
In recent years, central banks have been interested in this
area, but some of their researchers have discounted cryptocur-
rency solutions because the foundational technology appears
incompatible with central bank goals, especially the support
for KYC and AML laws. In this work, we showed how the
foundational elements of a cryptocurrency can be rethought to
support central bank goals and to explicitly support the laws
that apply to electronic fiat currencies. We hope to convince
the reader that this type of approach is technically feasible and
that cryptocurrencies can be developed that integrate with an
associated fiat currency and explicitly support the laws of the
respective government.
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